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Abstract 
 
I investigate the effects of Vietnam War’s veteran on long run economic development in 
Vietnam. Using a unique dataset containing the number of war invalids at province levels, I find 
the number of war invalids from each province to be an important determinant of its current 
economic performance. To correct for potential biases arising from reverse causality, 
measurement error and unobservable province characteristics, I use an instrumental variable 
approach exploiting distance to the 17th parallel demilitarized zone. I also find that the 
importance of the war invalids for contemporary development is a result of its impacts on overall 
provincial economic governance and other disaggregated economic institutions, such as the pro-
activity of provincial leadership, the quality of the legal institutions and services supporting 
business development. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The relationship between war and economic development has been controversial in economic 
history. Wars can have adverse impacts on later economic performance: war diverts resources 
from production, destroys physical capital and infrastructure and disrupts human capital 
accumulation. It may also destroy technology development and damage social fabric and 
endanger civil liberties (World Bank, 2003). At the same time, wars may also intensely impact 
the quality of institutions by creating political instability. These institutional effects of wars may 
in turn have negative impacts on long-run economic performance. However, war is likely to be 
beneficial to economic development by building new pro-growth institutions (Acemoglu et al, 
2009).  
 
Several recent empirical papers try to capture war impacts, including in Japan (Davis and 
Weinstein, 2002) and Vietnam (Miguel and Roland, 2010) and European countries (Organski 
and Kugler, 1977, 1980; Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 2004) on long term economic development. 
Almost all of these studies find few persistent local impacts of wars on economic trends.  
 
Davis and Weinstein (2002) find that the US bombing in major Japanese cities in the World War 
II had no long run impact on the population of those cities relative to prewar level. In the other 
study, Organski and Kugler (1977, 1980) show that the impacts of two world wars on European 
countries tend to prolong only 15-20 years, and these countries return to prewar growth trends 
after that. However, in another study, Ichino and Winter-Ebmer (2004) realize that in some 
European countries, people could not obtained higher education because of World War II 
suffered a considerable loss of subsequent earnings. 
 
Although some studies have been done on the impacts of war on long run economic development 
cross and within countries, much less is known about the evolution of institutions after wars. 
They have tried to identify the specific institutional factors that matter most for economic 
growth, including property rights (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001), social capital and 
cohesion (Knack and Keefer, 1997) but which of these are affected by wars remains unclear. The 
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social and institutional legacies of conflict are arguably the most important but least understood 
of all war impacts (Blattman and Miguel, 2009). 
 
Recently, Acemoglu et al (2009) examine the impact of the French Revolution of 1789 on 
neighboring countries. They show that the revolution destroyed the institutional underpinnings of 
the power of oligarchies and elites opposed to economic change; combined with the arrival of 
new economic and industrial opportunities in the second half of the 19th century, helping pave 
the way for future economic growth. The evidence suggests that areas that were occupied by the 
French and that underwent radical institutional reform experienced more rapid urbanization and 
economic growth, especially after 1850. 
 
There is little doubt that Vietnam has suffered the tragedies of the twentieth century, especially 
of war, more than most countries. From 1946 to 1954, the war for independence from the French 
took a large but unknown number of military and civilian casualties, perhaps up to a half-million 
dead and one million wounded (Harrison, 1989). Warfare was soon resumed at even more deadly 
levels with the replacement of the French colonial army by military forces from the United States 
and other countries. Between 1965 and 1975, the acceleration of the war reached its peak with 
the presence of more than a half-million American soldiers and massive aerial bombing 
campaigns that traumatized the world (Harrison, 1993). From 1965 to 1973, eight million tons of 
bombs were dropped on Vietnam. This was over three times the amount of bombs dropped 
throughout the whole of the Second World War and worked out hundreds tons for every man, 
woman and child living in Vietnam. Although there are no reliable statistics on the Vietnamese 
war losses during the wars, it is expected that numbers from one to three million Vietnamese war 
dead (Lewy, 1978; Thayer, 1985; Turley, 1986; Shenon, 1995).  
 
However, it is surprising that there is very little research that details the long term consequences 
of Vietnam War on economic development of Vietnam. Recent study by Miguel and Roland 
(2010) argues that wars cannot explain Vietnam’s current economic development. They find that 
US bombing does not have a robust statistically significant negative impact on poverty rates, 
consumptions levels, infrastructure, literacy or population density. Do (2009) examines the 
impacts of Agent Orange on the prevalence of cancer in Vietnamese population after 30 years 
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after the end of the Vietnam War. He concludes that there is no significant difference in the 
prevalence of reported cancer which is detected between communes with some degree of 
exposure and those with none. 
 
This paper is another attempt to provide an empirical examination of the importance of wars in 
shaping subsequent Vietnam’s economic development and institutions. Particularly, I investigate 
the impact of Vietnam War’s veteran, proxied by the number of invalids, on economic 
development and governance across provinces in Vietnam.  
 
Contrary to Miguel and Roland (2010), I find the Vietnam War has negative impacts on long 
term provincial economic development.  I find a robust negative relationship between the 
number of veterans, particularly the correlation of number of war invalids, and subsequent 
provincial economic performance. To better understand the reason behind the relationship 
between war invalids and current economic performance across provinces, I use instruments to 
estimate the causal effect of the number of war invalids on subsequent economic development. 
The instrument is the distance from each province to 17th parallel. The instrumented coefficients 
are negative and significant, suggesting that increased number of war invalids caused worse 
subsequent provincial economic performance. I then explore the potential channel of causality 
underlying the relationship between war invalids and find that war invalids can result in major 
effects on current provincial economic governance.  
 
This paper makes two important contributions to literatures on economics of development. First, 
this is one of the first studies investigating the long term impacts of wars on institutional quality. 
Second, it proposes potential channels through which veterans can affect economic development 
that remain unexplored.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. In the following section, I provide a brief description of 
history of Vietnam War and an overview of the manner in which North Vietnam recruit for their 
army. Section 3 documents the correlations that exist in the data, and Section 4 turns to potential 
channels of causality. Section 5 concludes. 
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2 Historical Background  
 
2.1 Overview of Vietnam War1 
 
The main feature of modern Vietnamese history was the mission for national unity and 
independence from foreign domination. In the 19th Century, Vietnam became a colony of the 
French. After the Vietnamese Communist forces, or Viet Minh, defeated the French colonial 
army at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954, Vietnam was granted independence. According to 
the Geneva Accords, Vietnam was partitioned temporarily into two parts, a communist in the 
North and a non-Communist in the South.  
 
After consolidating their communist system, the Vietnamese communist in the North supported 
the establishment of National Front for the Liberation (NLF) in 1960 and promoted guerilla war 
in the South Vietnam. In response to the guerilla war, the United States began sending military 
advisors in support of the government in the South. Since 1965, North Vietnam had increasingly 
provided assistance to the NLF movement by sending its troops, arms and supplies, advisors, and 
regular units of the North Vietnamese Army which were transported via an extensive network of 
trails and roads which became well known as the Ho Chi Minh trail.  
 
In August 1964, a US warship was reported to be attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats 
in the Gulf of Tonkin. Following this attack, American Congress passed the Southeast Asia 
Resolution which allowed President Lyndon Johnson to conduct military operations in the 
region without a declaration of war. On March 2, 1965, US aircraft began bombing targets in 
Vietnam and the first troops arrived. 
 
In January 1968, the massive Tet Offensive launched by the North Vietnamese distressed the 
confidence of the American people and media who had thought the war was going well. As a 
result of Tet, President Lyndon Johnson opted not to run for reelection and was succeeded by 
Richard Nixon. Nixon's plan for ending US involvement was to build up the Army of the 
Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) so that they could fight the war themselves. As this process of 
“Vietnamization” began, US troops started to return home.  
                                                  
1 This section reviews some common facts about the Vietnam War, and does not intend to justify any aspects of the 
conflict. 
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The Paris Peace Accords were later signed on January 27, 1973 which officially ended US 
involvement in the Vietnam conflict. In early 1975 the North invaded the South and quickly 
consolidated the country under its control. Saigon was captured on April 30, 1975. North 
Vietnam united both North and South Vietnam to form the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
 
2.2. Mobilization and the role of People’s Army of Vietnam 
 
To serve the quest of uniting country, the North of Vietnam tried to recruit soldiers from every 
class of society (Turley, 1980). The universal draft law, which was first carried out in 1960, 
required all men to have to register for military service in January as they turned age 18. They 
were expected to be drafted within 18 months following registration. Later, the draft age was 
lowered and the age eligible to serve was increase significantly. Young men were drafted as they 
finished school (Van Dyke, 1972). 
 
The motives of the men joining the armed forces of the North were probably mixed and cannot 
be determined accurately. Certainly patriotism and in some cases Communist beliefs were the 
dominant motivations (George, 1961). Nationalist fervor during the French and American wars 
played an important role in ensuring the success of Vietnam’s mass mobilization. During the 
escalation of the war, sporadic terror caused by the US bombing raids only served to strengthen 
the anti-American sentiments and increase popular commitment to the military struggle of the 
socialist regime (Van Dyke, 1972). 
 
The leaders of North Vietnam used several strategies to persuade people to join the military 
forces. They promoted the idea that joining the army was prestigious. The advantages of this 
choice were conveyed by the privileges provided to young men: advancement to the next grade 
in school at the end of the military tour of duty without passing the examination, and admission 
into the Labor Youth Group, an organization valued mostly for its prestige (Van Dyke, 1972). 
Moreover, if a PAV soldier was killed or wounded, his family was protected and his children 
received preference in education and jobs (Kolko, 1985). Five percent of job in government 
agencies and state-owned factories were set aside for veterans (Teerawichitchainan, 2005). 
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In 1975, the size of PAV was estimated to be about one million. At the time, Vietnam’s armed 
forces were ranked the fourth largest in the world (Beresford, 1988). In spite of the declining 
popularity in military service among the Vietnamese, the PAV continues to play significant role 
in shaping Vietnam’s political, economic and social order (Pike, 1986). Since its establishment 
in 1940s, the PAV has always been a highly politicized and influential institution. During 
wartime, the Vietnam Communist Party used the PAV to politicize and mobilize the whole 
Vietnamese society. After the wars, the close ties between the PAV and the Communist Party 
continue to be maintained. At the same time, the Veteran’s Association is considered one of the 
most powerful mass organizations (Pike, 1986). 
 
3 Data description 
 
To examine the impacts of Vietnam War’s veteran on long term economic development, I use 
the number of war invalids. The number of war invalids of People’s Army of Vietnam can be 
used as a proxy for the war impact with the argument that the number of war invalids will 
correlate closely with the number of veterans at each province. The war invalid data is taken 
from the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs for 63 provinces. This dataset covers all 
the invalids from the Vietnam War who receive compensation from the government. Therefore, 
this data only include all invalids from North Vietnam and the National Front for the 
Liberalization in the South (so-called Communist invalids)2. The statistics on Vietnam War’s 
invalids are taken from year 2007. After the war, the number of invalids has been updated as new 
people present evidences showing that they are injured as serving in military work. Invalids who 
died are taken out of the list. 
 
To our best knowledge, this dataset embodies the most complete, comprehensive and reliable 
summary available of number of war invalids in the Vietnam War. Of course, this number is not 
necessary to ensure an accurate number of war invalids because a quite large number of civilians 
                                                  
2 Other invalids from Army of the Republic of Vietnam (so-called non-Communist invalids) are not taken into 
account due to unavailable data. However, we assume that they do not make significant effects on economic 
performance across provinces. Veterans and families of veterans who worked for South Vietnam government did 
not receive any compensation for their loss and sufferings. After the war, people having relationship South Vietnam 
military and government were sent to reeducation camps. Their families were discriminated against and restricted in 
some opportunities of education and occupations (Lamb, 2002; Teerawichitchainan, 2005) 
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who do not have enough evidence to show that they were injured as serving in military work 
cannot listed as war invalids.   
 
The data are summarized in Table 2, where the total number of war invalids is classified into two 
categories: war invalids and sick soldiers. Both of them can be disaggregated into their ability to 
work. The number of war invalids and sick soldiers with working ability declining from 21 to 60 
per cent accounts for large part of the total number of war invalids, making of around 68 per cent 
of the total war invalids and sick soldiers. 
 
Table 3 and Figure 1 present the geographic distribution of war invalids intensity in Vietnam in 
greater detail. While invalids intensity was highest in the Red River Delta, North coastal 
provinces and near the 17th parallel, it was also high in the “Iron Triangle” region of South 
Vietnam adjacent to Cambodia, the endpoint of the Ho Chi Minh Trail - a complex web of 
different jungle paths that enabled communist troops to travel from North Vietnam to areas close 
to Saigon. The war invalids are also high in some big cities of North Vietnam such as Ha Noi, 
Hai Phong and Nam Dinh which have been destroyed heavily by US bombing in the Linebacker 
campaign. 
 
4 Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Basic Results 
 
I examine this relationship between war invalids with income by controlling for other provincial 
characteristics that are also potentially important for current income. Our baseline estimating 
equation is 
 
iiiii XCpopinvalidsY  
''
10 )/ln(  
where Yi is the natural log of real per capita GDP in province i and ln(invalids/pop)i is the 
natural log of the total number of war invalids normalized by population in 20073. Per capita 
                                                  
3 The number of war invalids is normalized by population in 2007 to investigate more accurate the impacts of 
invalids on current economic performance. I also try another functional form such as 
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GDP data are for the year 2007 and from GSO (2009). Ci is a vector of dummy variables that 
indicate which regions a province belongs to. These are included to control for the other 
significant characteristics such as cultural characteristics. Xi is a vector of control variables. OLS 
estimates are reported in Table 5. 
 
In column (1), we estimate the impact of war invalids without controlling for regional and 
national city dummy fixed effects. The estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. 
However, as Figure 2 shows, provinces in northeast, northwest and central highland regions 
where are remote and mountainous areas and concentrate a large proportion of ethnic minority 
may have a significant influence on income.  
 
Vietnam is a multi-ethnic country with 54 ethnic groups. The Viet (Kinh) people account for 87 
per cent of the country’s population and mainly inhabit the Red River delta, the central coastal 
delta, the Mekong delta and major cities. The other 53 ethnic minority groups are scattered over 
mountain areas (covering two-thirds of the country’s territory) spreading from the North to the 
South. Of which, the number of ethnic minority in northwest, northeast and central highland 
regions accounts for nearly 77 per cent of total ethnic minority as represented in Table 4.  
 
The Vietnam War is mostly between Kinh people. Without regional fixed effects, the results will 
be biased to zero as cultural and historical factors of provinces in northwest, northeast and 
central highland regions that affect the motivation and of joining North Vietnamese army and 
also correlate with poor economic development in these provinces. This argument is confirmed 
as I control for regional fixed effects, the effect of log of invalids/pop increases by ten times and 
becomes statistically significant. 
 
 There is one province which is BRVT that may have significant impact on the result. The 
economic development of this province depends much on revenues from offshore oil extraction. 
However, if one removes this province, a highly significant, negative relationship still exists. It is 
confirmed by formal sensitivity and robustness tests. 
                                                                                                                                                               
iiii invalidPOPGDP   )log()log()log( 22007102007 to check whether income in each province 
has been driven by population. The result shows that coefficient of invalids is still significant at .01. 
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In addition to our key explanatory variables, I include a number of other location-based control 
variables. In the fourth column, I also include controls that capture the potential importance of 
geography and climate for long-term economic development: soil quality measured by 
proportion of agricultural land. I also include average monthly rainfall, average monthly 
temperature variables in Column (5). Column (6) reports the same specifications as reported 
Column (5), except that Distance to main economic centers variable is included in the regression 
equations. 
 
In all the case of specifications with regional characteristics controlled, war invalids are 
negatively correlated with subsequent economic development. The estimated coefficient from 
the income regressions suggests that a one standard deviation decrease in war invalids increases 
income per capita in 2007 by 0.22 per cent. Moreover, the relationship between war invalids and 
income is robust to the inclusion of additional control variables. This is true whether the control 
variables are added individually or simultaneously. 
 
Provinces near the 17th parallel and South Vietnam are the area where most of the fighting 
occurred, hence most deaths and wounded happened there. Therefore, it is relevant to assume the 
majority of injured people occur in provinces near 17th parallel. However, it is possible that after 
the war, invalids move around the whole country, especially to economic centres and other 
developed coastal regions. Consequently, it is likely to make the inference biased in the direction 
to overestimate impacts of the war in some provinces and underestimate the impacts in the 
others. 
 
However, there are some reasons explaining why the problem is not too serious as expected. 
First, twelve provinces with higher number of war invalids, including Nghe An, Thanh Hoa, Ha 
Noi, Ha Tinh, Thai Binh, Quang Ngai, Nam Dinh, Hai Duong, Quang Nam, Binh Dinh, HCM, 
Hai Phong are the places which occur main battles and target bombing by US airforce. For 
example, Ha Noi and Hai Phong are bombed heavily from 1966-1968 and 1972 with the main 
target to destroy basically infrastructure and industry of North Vietnam. Hochiminh city, 
especially at the end of Ho Chi Minh trail, also suffers high bombing intensity by the US air 
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force to prevent North Vietnam sending troops and supporting National Front for the Liberation 
in the South. Main battles between North Vietnamese forces and Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam frequently occur in this area to seek to control Saigon (old capital of South Vietnam and 
renamed as HCM city). Thanh Hoa, Ha Tinh, Thai Binh, Nam Dinh, Hai Duong in the North and 
Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh are provinces with high intensity of US bombing. These 
provinces are in the quintile of the most intensity of US bombs, missiles and rockets per km2 
(Miguel and Roland, 2010). Second, due to health and physical limitation, I assume that almost 
all of them will stay in provinces where they live. Third, I also assume that the massive 
migration only happens within 20 years after the war. If so, we are looking the impacts of 
veterans on provincial economic development over the past 10 years.   
 
4.2 Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
 
 
I perform a number of sensitivity and robustness tests. Table 6 reports the robustness of the 
results to changes in the sample. I omit provinces that may be different from the rest of the 
sample to see if this influences the results. It is possible that the results are being driven by a 
group of provinces with characteristics that are unrelated to the Vietnam War. The first row of 
Table 6 reports the result with full sample. In the second row, I report the results when provinces 
in northeast, central highland and northwest regions are omitted from the sample. Since these 
provinces include a large share of ethnic minority, economic performance may be different from 
other provinces for reasons unrelated to the war. Omitting these provinces change the results 
substantially as explained above. The coefficient on invalids becomes negative and statistically 
significant. I also re-estimate the regression with two sub-samples, one for Northern provinces 
and another for Southern ones. It is often argued that provinces in the South have economic 
performance better than those of the North due to legacy of market-orientation. The Northern 
sample does not include northeast and northwest provinces. Doing this does not change the 
results. The coefficient on invalids remains negative and statistically significant. 
 
I test whether the results are being driven by a small number of influential outliers. Table 7 
reports the robustness of the results to changes in the sample of provinces. I omit provinces that 
may be different from the rest of the sample to see if this influences the results. I identify 
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influential observations using a number of standard rules that have been proposed in the 
literature. I omit these outliers and re-estimate the baseline equation. Overall, the results remain 
robust to this procedure. 
 
4.3 Instrumental Variables: Reverse causality, Unobservable Province Characteristics and 
Measurement Error 
 
Although the OLS estimates show that there is a relationship between war invalids and current 
economic performance, it remains unclear whether the number of war invalids has a causal 
impact on current income. An alternative explanation for the relationship is that provinces that 
were initially underdeveloped have more people forced to be drafted (and more killed and 
wounded), and these provinces continue to be underdeveloped today. Therefore, we observe a 
negative relationship between war invalids and current income, even though the war invalids did 
not have any effect on subsequent economic development. In this section, I use two strategies to 
evaluate whether there is a causal effect of war invalids on income. First, using historical data, I 
evaluate the characteristics of selection. As I will show, the evidence suggests that selection was 
important, but it was usually the provinces that were the most prosperous, not the most 
underdeveloped, have more people enlisting. Given this evidence, the strong relationship 
between war invalids and current income is not driven by selection. Instead, selection will tend 
to bias the OLS estimates towards zero.  Second, I use the road distance from each province to 
17th parallel as an instrument for the number of war invalids. The instrumental variable (IV) 
results confirm the OLS estimates. 
 
4.3.1 Historical Evidence of Selection 
 
Due to unavailability of GDP per capita at province level, data on initial population densities is 
used to check whether the more prosperous or less prosperous areas have more invalids. 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2002) have shown that population density is a reasonable 
indicator of economic prosperity. I choose population densities in 1958 as a proxy of initial 
economic prosperity due to two reasons. First, this year is chosen four years after mass 
emigration of northerners to the South in 1954-55; therefore, it minimizes selection bias due to 
population adjustment across provinces. Second, this year is selected as two years before the 
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North's Central Committee issued a secret resolution authorizing an "armed struggle". This 
authorized the southern communists to begin large-scale operations against the South 
Vietnamese military. After that, North Vietnam supplied troops and supplies in earnest, and the 
infiltration of men and weapons from the north began along the Ho Chi Minh trail. In 1960, 
Hanoi authorized the creation of the National Liberalization Front as a common front controlled 
by the communist party in the South. It is expected that population density was only impacted 
significantly by the main battles and US bombing from 1960s. 
 
Figure 7 shows the relationship between the natural log of population density in 1958 and 
ln(invalid/area). The data confirms the provinces that were the most prosperous in 1958, 
measured by population density, tend also to be the areas that were most impacted by the war 
invalids. Therefore, it is likely that reverse causality is not problematic. 
 
However, because of lack of data of migration, this correlation is likely to be spurious. Since 
invalids can migrate to high developed provinces and wealthy provinces in the past are more 
likely to remain prosperous today, therefore, we observe high correlation between two trends.  
 
4.3.2 Instrumental variables 
 
The second strategy that I pursue is to use instrumental variables. There are some justifications 
for using the instrumental approach. 
 
First, if important province characteristics are unobservable or immeasurable, then controlling 
for all quantifiable province characteristics will still not result in true estimates of the effect of 
the war invalids on development. Examples of a province’s unobservable characteristics are its 
culture and historical factors. If unobservable province characteristics caused people in certain 
provinces to select to enlist and more people are likely to be wounded or killed, and if these 
characteristics persist today, causing poor economic performance, then the size of the estimated 
effect of war invalids on income will be biased away from zero. I include percentage of minority 
in each province as explanatory variable but it is unlikely to capture all unobserved omitted 
factors. 
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Second, one potential bias arises because of measurement error in the war invalid data. Classical 
errors-in-variables will lead to a bias towards zero. In addition, it is likely that the war dataset 
underestimate the number of war invalids, resulting in a form of non-classical measurement error 
(Nunn, 2008). Because of the high rates of people having been injured in the war but not be 
regarded as invalids, this form of measurement error may be significant. 
 
Given the two potential biases it is unclear whether the estimated effects will be greater or less 
than the true effect. A standard solution to all of these problems is the use of instrumental 
variables. If a variable can be found that is correlated with war invalids, but is uncorrelated with 
both the province’s unobservable characteristics and the forms of measurement error, then the IV 
procedure will yield consistent coefficient estimates.  
 
I use the road distance from capital of each province to infamous seventeenth parallel as an 
instrument for number of war invalids. In the Vietnam War, the seventeenth parallel was the 
provisional military demarcation line and the border between North and South Vietnam 
established by the Geneva Accords of 1954 that ended the French colonial era in Indochina. The 
reasons to choose distance to 17th parallel are based on the arguments by Miguel and Roland 
(2010). In this paper, they argue that the damage by the war increases as one approach the former 
border divided Vietnam. The authors show that the heaviest bombing take place in the central 
region near the 17th parallel with Quang Tri is the province that is basically boomed flat during 
the wars with most of its capital and infrastructure destroyed. Provinces near north and south of 
Quang Tri also receive heavy US bombing but less intensity. Coastal regions of North Vietnam 
and other main cities such as Ha Noi and Hai Phong are heavily bombed. It is expected that 
provinces with high bombing intensity were suffering more invalids and casualties. If so, 
distance to the seventeenth parallel will be strongly significant predictor of number of invalids 
and casualties during the war.  
 
Indeed, distance to 17th parallel is a powerful predictor of the number of war invalids. It is 
reasonable to believe that this instrument will not directly influence or be influenced by income 
other than through its effect on war invalids, when control is used for other variables. The high 
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correlation (r = -.58) between the instrument (distance to 17th parallel) and the endogenous 
variable (number of invalids) and the presumably very weak correlation, if any, between the 
instrument and the error term of the regression likely minimizes the bias for the IV-2SLS 
estimator4. 
 
I estimate the following system of equations using 2SLS, 
 
iiiii
iiiii
XRZInv
XRInvY
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
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where Y is real per capita GDP; Inv is ln(invalids/pop); R is the vector of regional dummy 
variables; X is a vector of other control variables and Z is an instrument.  
 
Table 8 reports the results of the IV estimates. In column (1), I report the OLS estimates. From 
columns (2) to (5), the IV estimates are reported. The real provincial GDP per capita in 1990 as 
the initial conditions of provinces at the early of the reform is controlled for. The estimated 
coefficients of the instruments in the second stage are of the expected sign. The further a 
province is from 17th parallel, the lower the number of war invalids from that province. All 
coefficients are statistically significant. 
 
In the second stage, the estimated coefficient for ln(invalid/pop) remains significant and 
negative. The results of the Hausman test reject the null hypothesis that the OLS estimate of the 
coefficient of ln(invalid/pop) is consistent. 
 
I rerun the regression with Northern and Southern samples separately. The results indicate that 
invalids have biggest impacts on the North and become insignificant on the South.  The sample 
without northeast and northwest provinces does not change the results. The coefficient on 
invalids remains negative and statistically significant 
                                                  
4 If a proposed instrument is not strongly correlated with the suspected endogenous variables then it leads to a bias 
in the estimates. This is commonly known as the problem of weak instruments. I also use LIML Fuller Instrumental 
variable estimation method that is a bias-corrected limited information maximum likelihood estimator and provides 
the most unbiased estimates for inference purposes when the instrument is potentially weak (Stock, Wright and 
Yogo, 2002; Stock and Yogo, 2005). The regression provides similar estimates. 
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To be a valid instrument, distance to 17th parallel has to satisfy the so-called exclusion condition 
with an assumption that the instrument only affects current economic performance through war 
invalids. To investigate whether this condition holds, I consider two possible violations of the 
exclusion condition. One concern is distance to 17th is likely to correlate with distance to main 
economic centres (Hanoi or HCMC), which could possibly affect GDP per capita across 
provinces through several other channels, such as the acquisition of FDI, educational quality and 
access to international trade. Thus, our instrument could affect economic performance through 
distance to the main economic centres rather than through invalids. The other is our instrument 
may correlate with geographic conditions such as rainfall, temperature, arable land or 
urbanization that are likely to affect agriculture and economic development across provinces. I 
try to control some additional variables to check robustness5. However, we are never sure that we 
can control all other observable and unobservable variables which correlate with income and 
instrument variables.  
 
I perform these tests by adding percentage of urban population, distance to the main economic 
centres, geographic factors as additional controls in our regression of war invalids. The 
magnitude of the coefficient in IV estimation does not change substantially if other controls are 
included, ranging from -0.24 to -0.3. The results in Column 6 of Table 9 show that our 
instrument is still significant in explaining war invalids when all other variables are controlled. 
 
The magnitudes of the IV estimates are not much different from the OLS estimates. One 
explanation for this is that the attenuation bias, resulting from both the classical and non-classical 
measurement errors, cancels out the bias resulting from unobservable province characteristics. 
Thus, the OLS estimates are slightly biased towards zero, and instrumenting war invalids results 
in an increase in the estimate magnitude of the coefficient.  
 
 
                                                  
5 US bombing in the Vietnam War correlates with the distance to 17th parallel and is possible to affect the economic 
development across provinces after the war. To take into this possible impact, the income per capita in 1990 is 
controlled for to capture the initial condition of each province. Moreover, according to Miguel and Roland (2010), 
the U.S. bombing does not have a statistically significant negative impact on poverty rates, consumption, growth, 
long-run population density, infrastructure and literary after 25 years. 
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4.4 Channels of Causality 
 
In an initial attempt to determine the channels of causality between the war invalids across 
provinces and their current level of development, I investigate the impact of invalids on 
economic performance by correlating ln(invalid/pop) with economic governance index. This 
index is constructed from a survey on the satisfaction of business community on a broad range of 
economic governance in Vietnam’s provinces, carried out by the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry and Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative called the Provincial 
Competiveness Index (PCI) in 2007 (Malesky, 2007).  
 
As a direct test of the hypothesis that the war invalids affects economic performance today 
through its effect on the quality of economic governance, I estimate the system of equations with 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors of the following form: 
 
iiii
iiii
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where Y is log income; Q is a measure of the quality of domestic institutions, the provincial 
economic institutions in 2007; R is a vector of regional dummy variables; Inv is ln(invalids/pop). 
 
The number of war invalids is considered excluded exogenous variables in that they are used as 
instrumental variables to extract the exogenous component of the institutions index but they are 
excluded from the second stage regression. The regression addresses the question: Does the 
aggregate governance index explained by the number of invalids explain cross-province 
differences in the logarithm of GDP per capita? If β1 is significant, then this suggests that the 
number of war invalids influences economic development through institutions, which is 
consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
I estimate the system of equations by two stages. Results are reported in column (3) of Table 10. 
The result supports the hypothesis of the war invalids affecting development through the quality 
of province institutions. In the first stage, ln(invalid/pop) is found to be negatively correlated 
with the economic governance index and the estimated coefficient is highly significant. The 
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estimated coefficient for the instrumented economic governance tends to be nine time higher 
than the magnitude of the estimated coefficient when OLS is used.  
 
4.5 The effects of war invalids on disaggregated governance 
 
The Provincial Competitive Index is a composite indicator which is contributed by ten sub-
indices. I investigate how specific types of economic governance may be affected by war 
invalids by replacing my analysis of general economic governance variable with PCI sub-
indices.  
 
I proposed some channels through which war invalids create effects on current economic 
governance.  
 
First, invalids can pass their ideological beliefs about socialist and old style centrally planning 
system on the next generation. Invalids in particular and People’s Army of Vietnam in general 
have strong belief and offer an absolute loyalty to the leadership of Communist Party and the 
political system the Party chooses. Therefore, they could educate other young people what they 
have been learned and believed. Alesina and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) in another study 
come up with similar conclusion. They investigate the effects of Communism on people’s 
preferences on redistribution and show that East German significantly tend to have preferences 
for state intervention than a West German. Moreover, older East Germans, who live longer under 
the Communist regime, are more likely to believe in social conditions as a major determinant of 
individual fortune, which are a basic theory of the Marxist way of thinking, than younger East 
Germans. A possible explanation is suggested to the finding above is that East Germans, who are 
under the impacts of Communist philosophy,  are used to thinking that it is “society’s fault” if 
people are poor, unemployed or in need of help. Thus it is government’s obligation to take care 
of these problems. 
 
Second, after the war, invalids (and veterans) can work for local government agencies, especially 
those with working ability declining from 20-61 per cent, accounting for 63 per cent of total 
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invalids and sick soldiers. They can affect the effectiveness of local government operation6. Even 
the country has transformed to market economy more than 30 years but their habits of thought 
following the old planning systems are expected to be persistent and difficult to change. 
 
Third, provinces with more human and physical capital destroyed heavily by the war (and more 
invalids) tend to be more dependent on budget transfer and resources from the central 
government. This makes them to be more vulnerable to factionalize political leadership and less 
likely to engage in their own initiatives to build up local market institutions (Malesky and 
Taussig, 2009). Figure 10 shows correlation between war invalids and average transfers 
normalized by population between 2005 and 2007. To make the result more precise, I exclude 
poor and underdeveloped provinces in Northeast and Northwest regions which receive a 
substantial large amount of budget transfer. The graph shows that correlation is strong and 
significant at 0.01 level. 
 
Therefore, it is expected that local government at provinces with more war invalids are likely 
less to support market economy and so has trouble dealing so well with foreign and even 
domestic private investors. In this view, unfriendly market environment limit the upside growth 
in these provinces. 
 
Table 11 reports the results of regressions estimated with different measures of governance 
quality used as the dependent variable. I regress each dependent variable on ln(invalid/pop). I 
also estimate each regression with the set of regional controls included. The coefficients on the 
key causal variables and standard errors have been displayed.  
 
Confirming these arguments, the sign of the coefficients suggest that war invalids are negatively 
correlated with ‘good’ institutions. The strongest impacts of war invalids on the individual 
subindices are confidence in legal institutions, pro-activity of provincial leadership and private 
development services. Of which, the war invalids impact most on confidence in legal 
institutions.  
                                                  
6 Veterans, especially Party’s members, often have been assigned relatively important positions in local government 
systems due to their loyalty and belief in the political system. See Rama, M., 2008. ‘Making Difficult Choices: 
Vietnam in Transition’ for more detail on decision making in the reform process in Vietnam.  
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The legal institution index measures the private sector's confidence in provincial legal 
institutions; whether firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute 
resolution, or as an avenue for lodging appeals against corrupt official behavior. The provinces 
with less war invalids are likely to be more transparent in resolving dispute based on courts. The 
result shows that one standard decrease in the war invalids is associated with a 0.64 per cent 
increase in this index. Because these indices are generated by firm surveys, there is potential that 
perceptions biases, particularly halo effects, may be responsible for this relation (Malesky and 
Taussig, 2009). As a robustness test, I make a regression of the equation only with a hard 
indicator which is cases filled by non-state entities at provincial economic courts as a proxy for 
confidence in legal institutions that are not derived from the survey. The result is statistically 
significant. 
 
The number of war invalids also affects the Pro-activity of Provincial Leadership. The result 
shows that provinces with higher invalids tend to be less creative in designing their own 
initiatives for private sector development and working with unclear national regulatory 
frameworks to assist local private firms. These provinces are also less support for private sector 
development by supplying services such as trade promotion, provision of regulatory information 
to firms, business partner matchmaking, provision of industrial zones or industrial clusters, and 
technological services for firms. However, the result is not robust as for case of using 
instrumental variables. 
 
Since the number of war invalids concentrates more on the North, we expect the impacts of wars 
on Northern provinces are more severe. Therefore, I re-examine the impacts of war veterans on 
the North. The results also indicate that the leaders of provinces with more invalids become less 
pro-active and less favourable to private business development than the overall country 
performance. 
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5 Conclusion 
 
Using the unique dataset on number of invalids, I find that Vietnam War’s veterans, particularly 
the number of war invalids, to be an important determinant of economic development in each 
province more than 30 years after the end of the War. This result is robust to a number of 
sensitivity tests, including the addition of a number of explanatory variables that previous studies 
have found to be important determinants of economic development. I also used the distance to 
17th parallel as an instrument to estimate the causal effect of the war invalids on provincial 
economic development. The IV results support the findings from OLS. The estimated effect of 
the war invalids on income remains negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the 
number of war invalids results in worse economic development. I then examined the channels of 
causality underlying the relationship between war invalids and economic development. I find 
that the relationship between the war invalid and current provincial economic performance can 
be explained by the war invalid’s effect on the quality of provincial economic governance and 
other disaggregated economic governance indices, such as the pro-activity of provincial 
leadership, the quality of the legal institutions and services supporting business development. 
The result also shows that the effects are more profound in Northern provinces. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Number 
of Obs 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Log Real GDP per capita 2007 (lngdppc07) 63 1.69 .481 .854 3.55 
Log War invalids normalized by population 2007 
(ln(invalid/pop)) 
63 -.57 .735 -2.30 .92 
Provincial competitive Index 2007 (pci07) 63 58.76 6.75 43.9 76.02 
Log Distance to 17th  Parallel (Dis17) 63 6.48 0.67 3.63 7.21 
Percentage of Agricultural land 2007  63 36.93 23.4 7.2 82.7 
Average monthly rainfall (2004-2007) 63 1749.2 456.5 734 3294 
Average monthly temperature (2004-2007) 63 24.43 2.3 18.3 27.7 
Urbanization (percentage of urban population 2007) 63 23.73 16.08 7.38 86.71 
Log Distance to main economic centers 63 4.91   2.30 4.91  2.30 
Percentage of  Minority 63 1.16 2.15 0 11.48 
 
 
 
Table 2. Total invalids and sick soldiers in Vietnam War 
 
Classification Number Percentage of total 
War Invalids 487,378 74.34 
with working ability declines from 21% - 
60% 415,564 63.39 
       from 61% - 80% 55,934 8.53 
       more than 81%  11,937 1.82 
       more than 81% with severe injury 3,943 0.60 
Sick soldiers  168,235 25.66 
with working ability declines from 41% - 
50% 17,480 2.67 
       from 51% - 60% 11,135 1.70 
      from 61% - 70% 120,273 18.35 
      from 71% - 80% 16,760 2.56 
      from 81% - 90% 1,713 0.26 
      from 91% -100% 83 0.01 
     more than 81% with severe injury  791 0.12 
Total 655,613 100 
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Table 3. Total invalids and sick soldiers: Top 12 Provinces 
 
Provinces Number Percentage of total 
Nghe An 49961 7.6% 
Thanh Hoa 48075 7.3% 
Ha Noi  42372 6.5% 
Ha Tinh 31977 4.9% 
Thai Binh 28682 4.4% 
Quang Ngai 26598 4.1% 
Nam Dinh  24758 3.8% 
Hai Duong 22244 3.4% 
Quang Nam  21186 3.2% 
Binh Đinh  21123 3.2% 
HCM  19219 2.9% 
Hai Phong 16478 2.5% 
Table 4. Share of ethnic minority over total ethnic minority 
Regions Percentage of total 
Northeast  
     Ha Giang 6.31 
    Tuyen Quang 4.14 
    Cao Bang 7.97 
    Lang Son 7.64 
    Lao Cai 4.29 
   Yen Bai 3.94 
   Bac Can 6.92 
   Thai Nguyen 2.11 
   Quang Ninh 1.03 
   Phu Tho 1.08 
   Bac Giang 1.03 
Northwest  
   Lai Chau 6.13 
   Son La 6.12 
   Hoa Binh 5.84 
Central Highland 12.37 
Total 76.91 
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Figure 1. Income and War invalid’s distribution  
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Note: The left-hand side is income per capita quintile distribution. The right-hand side is the 
quintile distribution of number of war invalids normalized by provincial population. 
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Figure 2. Ethnic minority distribution 
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Figure 3. Vietnam War Map 
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Figure 4. Relationship between log War Invalids normalized by provincial population, 
ln(invalid/pop07), and Log Real GDP Per Capita 2007 without controlling for regional effects 
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Figure 5. Relationship between log War Invalids normalized by provincial population, 
ln(invalid/pop07), and Log Real GDP Per Capita 2007 after controlling for regional and national 
city fixed effects 
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Figure 6. Outliers and influential observations 
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Table 5. Relationship between War invalids and Income 
 
 Dependent variable is log real per capita GDP in 2007 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ln(invalid/pop07) -0.023 
(0.091) 
-0.22*** 
(0.077) 
-0.26*** 
(0.086) 
-0.195** 
(0.086) 
-0.192*** 
(0.084) 
-0.2*** 
(0.074) 
Percentage of Minority   -0.04*** 
(0.014) 
-0.026 
(0.013) 
-0.03 
(0.015) 
-0.02 
(0.015) 
Agricultural land    0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
- 0.004 
(0.003) 
Average monthly 
temperature 
    0.015 
(0.035) 
0.024 
(0.033) 
Average monthly rainfall     -0.0001 
(0.0001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0001) 
Distance to main 
economic centers 
     -0.11*** 
(0.03) 
National city dummy No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Regional fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number obs. 63 63 63 63 63 63 
R-squared 0.0012 0.49 0.37 0.5 0.52 0.59 
Notes: Coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Regional fixed effects control for central highland, northeast and northwest regions. 
National city dummy variables control for Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh, Can Tho, Hai Phong, Da Nang. 
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Table 6. Income and Invalids: Robustness to subsamples. Dependent variable is log real GDP per 
capita in 2007 
 
Sample coef SE N R2 
Full -0.02 0.08 63 0.012 
Excluding  northeast, central highland and northwest provinces -0.39*** 0.10 44 0.28 
Only South -0.30** 0.10 33 0.18 
Only North (excluding  northeast and northwest provinces) -0.98*** 0.19 16 0.49 
     
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Northeast region contains LaoCai, YenBai, PhuTho, HaGiang, TuyenQuang, CaoBang, 
BacKan, ThaiNguyen, LangSon, BacGiang and QuangNinh. Northwest includes HoaBinh, SonLa, DienBien and 
LaiChau. Control variable is percentage of ethnic minority. 
 
 
 
Table 7. Robustness Tests. Omitting influential outliers. Dependent variable is log real GDP per 
capita in 2007 
 
 coef SE N R2 Omitted Observations 
Baseline -0.26*** 0.086 63 0.37 None 
 Omitting  influential outliers  
DFFITS -0.267*** 0.071 60 0.46 BRVT, HoaBinh, LaiChau 
Cook’s Distance -0.267*** 0.071 60 0.46 BRVT, HoaBinh, LaiChau 
Welsch Distance -0.267*** 0.071 60 0.46 BRVT, HoaBinh, LaiChau 
DFBETA -0.273*** 0.057 58 0.54 HaNoi, BRVT, AnGiang, HoaBinh, 
HCMC 
      
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity. Influential observations are omitted using the following 
standard rule. DFFITS: Omit if 
2/1)/(2 nkDFFITS i   (Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980)). Cook’s distance: Omit 
if Cook’s Distance > 4/n (Cook (1977)). Welsch distance: Omit if Welsch distance > 3/ k  (Welsch (1982)). 
Where n is the number of observations, 63, and k is the number of independent variables, 5. All regressions include 
regional dummy variables for central highland, northeast and northwest regions. 
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Figure 7. Relationship between initial population density and war invalids 
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Figure 8. Relationship between log war invalids normalized by provincial population and 
Distance to 17th Parallel 
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Table 7. Bivariate Correlation between distance to 17th parallel and other variables 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Distance to 17th 1       
2. Log Distance to main 
economic centers 
-0.26* 1      
3. Average monthly rainfall 
(2004-2007) 
-0.395* 0.274* 1     
4. Average monthly temperature 
(2004-2007) 
0.154   -0.095    0.015    1    
5. Urbanization (percentage of 
urban population 2007) 
-0.007   -0.374*   0.111    0.228    1   
6. Percentage of Agricultural 
land 2007 
0.498*   -0.287*   -0.291*    0.522* -0.069    1  
7. Log real GDP per capita in 
1990 
0.231   -0.461*   -0.073    0.525    0.674*    0.318*    1 
 Note: *, significant at 5 per cent. 
 
Table 8. IV Regressions with different samples 
 
 OLS Base Sample Excluded 
North 
Excluded  South Excluded Northeast 
and Northwest 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(invalid/pop)  -0.26*** 
(0.086) 
-0.25*** 
(0.1) 
-0.35 
(0.22) 
-0.61** 
(0.28) 
-0.28*** 
(0.11) 
F-stat 8.56 30.94 25.59 13.51 32.14 
Number obs. 63 63 33 30 49 
Distance to 17 parallel  -0.53*** 
(0.14) 
-0.48** 
(0.2) 
-0.27* 
(0.14) 
-0.48*** 
(0.13) 
Percentage of Minority  -0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
-0.1** 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.05) 
Initial condition (real GDP 
per capita in 1990) 
 -0.33* 
(0.17) 
-0.27 
(0.17) 
0.03 
(0.27) 
-0.42** 
(0.19) 
F-stat  11.66 11.22 18.78 10.33 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F statistics on excluded IV  14.15 5.84 3.9 13.59 
Stock-Yogo critical values:  5.53/16.38     
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Robust standard errors are in the brackets. Hausman p-values for endogenous tests are reported. The null hypothesis 
is that specified endogenous variable is exogenous. Regional fixed effects control for central highland, northeast and 
northwest regions. F statistics on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this 
case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent significance level critical values for 
weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size. The null hypothesis of 
weak instruments is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 9. IV Regressions with Additional Controls 
 
 OLS IV IV IV IV IV IV 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Second Stage. Dependent variable is log Real GDP per capita 2007 
ln(invalid/pop)  -0.26*** 
(0.086) 
-0.25*** 
(0.1) 
-0.3** 
(0.13) 
-0.24* 
(0.14) 
-0.24* 
(0.13) 
-0.24* 
(0.13) 
-0.29** 
(0.12) 
Percentage of Minority -0.04*** 
(0.014) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
F-stat 8.56 30.94 23.51 28.79 16.94 15.24 18.11 
Number obs. 63 63 63 63 63 63 63 
First Stage. Dependent variable is Log war invalids normalized by population 2007 
Distance to 17 parallel  -0.53*** 
(0.14) 
-0.51*** 
(0.17) 
-0.49*** 
(0.18) 
-0.49*** 
(0.13) 
-0.49*** 
(0.17) 
-0.52*** 
(0.17) 
Percentage of Minority  -0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.06 
(0.04) 
Initial condition (real GDP 
per capita in 1990) 
 -0.33* 
(0.17) 
-0.32* 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.51** 
(0.23) 
-0.12 
(0.2) 
-0.12 
(0.18) 
Average monthly rainfall   -0.0003 
(0.0002) 
   -0.0003* 
(0.0002) 
Average monthly 
temperature 
  -0.04 
(0.05) 
   -0.01 
(0.04) 
Urbanization    -0.01** 
(0.005) 
 -0.02** 
(0.007) 
-0.01*** 
(0.007) 
Agricultural land   -0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.007* 
(0.004) 
-0.008* 
(0.005) 
Distance to main economic 
centers 
    -0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.12** 
(0.05) 
-0.1** 
(0.05) 
F-stat  11.66 10.93 9.36 10.81 12.02 10.92 
Hausman test (p-value)  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
F statistics on excluded IV  14.15 8.72 7.37 7.8 8.43 9.78 
Stock-Yogo critical values:  5.53/16.38       
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Robust standard errors are in the brackets. Hausman p-values for endogenous tests are reported. The null hypothesis 
is that specified endogenous variable is exogenous. Regional fixed effects control for central highland, northeast and 
northwest regions. F statistics on excluded IV for weak-instrument tests are also reported. The null hypothesis in this 
case is that the instrument is weak. Stock-Yogo critical values are the 5 percent significance level critical values for 
weak instruments tests based on, respectively, 25 percent and 10 percent maximal IV size. The null hypothesis of 
weak instruments is rejected in the case that the F statistics on excluded IV exceeds the Stock-Yogo critical values. 
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Table 10. Impacts on income through provincial economic governance 
 
 OLS OLS Two-stage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel B. Dependent variable is log Real GDP per capita 2007 
Provincial Competitive Index 
2007 
0.016* 
(0.009) 
 0.102** 
(0.05) 
Ln(invalid/pop)  -0.26*** 
(0.086) 
 
Percentage of Minority -0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.04*** 
(0.014) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
F-stat 7.15 8.56 2.97 
Number obs. 63 63 63 
Panel A. Dependent variable is Provincial Competitive Index 2007   
ln(invalid/pop)   -2.55** 
(1.26) 
Percentage of Minority   -0.84* 
(0.34) 
Regional fixed effect   Yes 
F-stat   6.57 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Robust standard errors are in the brackets. Regional fixed effects control for central, northeast and northwest 
regions. 
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Table 11. War invalids and various measures of governance quality 
 
Dependent Variable 
OLS IV 
coef se coef se 
 For whole sample 
 
Overall economic institutions 
 
-2.55** 
 
1.26 
 
-2.9 
 
1.79 
 Regulation in business environment 
Entry Costs  0.08 0.16 0.54 0.33 
Bias to the State Sector -0.1 0.16 0.008 0.23 
Labor training -0.18 0.30 0.065 0.37 
Pro-activity of Provincial Leadership -0.68** 0.29 -0.97** 0.39 
Private Business Development -0.72** 0.29 -0.47 0.48 
Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance 0.05 0.15 -0.27 0.22 
 Property rights 
Land Access and Security of tenure -0.09 0.136 -0.45** 0.17 
 Accountability  
Confidence in Legal Institutions -0.63*** 0.19 -1.01*** 0.29 
   Hard  Legal Institutions -0.29** 0.14 -0.41* 0.23 
Informal Charges  -0.11 0.12 -0.3** 0.14 
Transparency of business information -0.05 0.21 0.03 0.21 
Regional Dummies Yes 
 For Northern provinces 
 
Overall economic institutions 
 
-3.25 
 
3.01 
 
-8.05*** 
 
2.85 
 Regulation in business environment 
Entry Costs  -0.13 0.27 1.59 1.59 
Bias to the State Sector -0.52** 0.22 -0.79 0.54 
Labor training 0.28 0.49 0.36 1.04 
Pro-activity of Provincial Leadership -1.2** 0.5 -2.84*** 1.00 
Private Business Development -0.8 0.63 -2.47*** 0.86 
Time Costs of Regulatory Compliance 0.55 0.55  -0.52 0.76 
 Property rights 
Land Access and Security of tenure 0.26 0.3 0.37 0.55 
 Accountability  
Confidence in Legal Institutions -0.58 0.52 -1.46 0.84 
   Hard  Legal Institutions -0.37 0.36 -1.23 0.86 
Informal Charges  -0.52** 0.25 -1.46** 0.46 
Transparency of business information -0.65 0.57 -0.84 0.53 
Regional Dummies Yes 
Notes: ***, ** and * indicates significance level of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. 
Regional fixed effects control for central highland, northeast and northwest regions for the whole sample and 
northeast and northwest for Northern provinces. Instrumental variable is distance to 17th parallel. 
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Figure 9. Relationship between number of war invalids and budget transfers 
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Appendix Table 1: Data Description and Sources 
 
Log Real GDP per capita: Log of provincial real GDP per capita in 2007. Source: GSO (2009)  
Population density in 1958: Source: Vietnam Statistical Yearbook 1972, National Institute of Statistics 
and General Statistics Office (GSO). Due to some changes in administrative borders, some provinces do 
not exist in both North and South Vietnam in 1958 and some present provinces are merged from some 
1958 provinces. For example, in 1958, Vietnam was composed of 25 provinces in the North and 43 in the 
South, compared to current 30 in the North and 34 in the South. Districts of old provinces in the South 
may be merged with other neighbour provinces. We construct 1958 population data by matching old 
provinces with new ones. 
Distance to main economic centers: Distance from capital of each province to nearest main economic 
centers (Hanoi or HCM) by road. Source: Author’s own calculation.  
 
Agricultural land: Percentage of agricultural land over total land in each province. Source: GSO (2009) 
 
Urbanization: Percentage of urban population over total population in each province in 2007. Source: 
GSO (2009) 
 
Distance to 17th parallel: Distance from the capital of each province to 17th parallel by road. Source: 
Author’s own calculation. 
 
Province is national-level city: Dummy variable representing Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh city, Can Tho, Hai 
Phong, Da Nang. Source: Author’s own calculation 
 
Ethnic minority in provinces: Percentage of ethnic minority over total population at each province in 
1989. Source: Vietnam Population Census (1989) 
 
Temperature: Average monthly temperature over 2004 – 2007 period, measured in degrees Celsius. 
Source: Provincial Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
Rainfall: Average monthly temperature over 2004 – 2007 period, measured in millimeters. Source: 
Provincial Statistical Yearbook, various years. 
 
War invalids: Including both number of war invalid and diseased soldiers. Source: Ministry of Labour, 
Invalids and Social Affairs (2008).  
 
Initial condition: Log of provincial real GDP per capita in 1990. Source: GSO  
  
Provincial Economic Governance: Ranking of economic governance in Vietnam’s 63 provinces by the 
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (PCI Survey 
2007). Data is from the Provincial Competiveness Survey available at www.pcivietnam.org 
 
Entry Costs: A measure of: i) the time it takes a firm to register and acquire land; ii) the time to receive 
all the necessary licenses needed to start a business; iii) the number of licenses required to operate a 
business; and iv) the perceived degree of difficulty to obtain all licenses/permits. Source: PCI Survey 
2007. 
 
Land Access and Security of Tenure: A measure combining two dimensions of the land problems 
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confronting entrepreneurs: how easy it is to access land and the security of tenure once land is acquired. 
Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
Transparency and Access to Information: A measure of whether firms have access to the proper 
planning and legal documents necessary to run their businesses, whether those documents are equitably 
available, whether new policies and laws are communicated to firms and predictably implemented, and 
the business utility of the provincial webpage. Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
Time Costs and Regulatory Compliance: A measure of how much time firms waste on bureaucratic 
compliance, as well as how often and for how long firms must shut their operations down for inspections 
by local regulatory agencies. Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
Informal Charges: A measure of how much firms pay in informal charges, how much of an obstacle 
those extra fees pose for their business operations, whether payment of those extra fees results in expected 
results or ‘services,’ and whether provincial officials use compliance with local regulations to extract 
rents. Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
SOE Bias and Competition Environment: A measure focusing on the perceived bias of provincial 
governments toward state-owned enterprises, equitized firms, and other provincial champions in terms of 
incentives, policy, and access to capital. Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
Proactivity of Provincial Leadership: A measure of the creativity and cleverness of provinces in 
implementing central policy, designing their own initiatives for private sector development, and working 
within sometimes unclear national regulatory frameworks to assist and interpret in favor of local private 
firms. Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
Private Sector Development Services: A measure of provincial services for private sector trade 
promotion, provision of regulatory information to firms, business partner matchmaking, provision of 
industrial zones or industrial clusters, and technological services for firms. Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
Labor and Training: A measure of the efforts by provincial authorities to promote vocational training 
and skills development for local industries and to assist in the placement of local labor. Source: PCI 
Survey 2007. 
 
Legal Institutions: A measure of the private sector's confidence in provincial legal institutions; whether 
firms regard provincial legal institutions as an effective vehicle for dispute resolution, or as an avenue for 
lodging appeals against corrupt official behavior. Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
Hard Legal Institutions: A measure of cases filled by non-state entities at provincial economic court. 
Source: PCI Survey 2007. 
 
 
Sample 
Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Da Nang, HCMC, Can Tho, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, 
Quang Tri, TT-Hue, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Dong Thap, 
An Giang, Tien Giang, Vinh Long, Ben Tre, Kien Giang, Tra Vinh, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, Ca 
Mau, Binh Phuoc, Tay Ninh, Ninh Thuan, Long An, Quang Ninh, Hau Giang, BRVT, Bac Ninh, 
Binh Duong, Binh Thuan, Dong Nai, Ha Nam, Hai Duong, Hung Yen, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, 
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Thai Binh, Vinh Phuc, Bac Kan, Bac Giang, Cao Bang, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Dien Bien, Gia Lai, 
Hoa Binh, Kon Tum. 
 
